NEW YORK (AFP) – Rwanda's President Paul Kagame bristled Tuesday at suggestions that democracy is not flourishing in his country, and said that the 93 percent of the vote he won last year was not enough.
Kagame said Rwanda enjoys a multi-party political system and that he supports "a right that allows anybody, everybody to express themselves."
He said the will of the people was expressed during last year's presidential election. "So, 93 percent -- I wonder why it wasn't higher than that," Kagame told the Council on Foreign Relations, a prominent New York-based think tank.
When a senior Human Rights Watch director in the audience challenged Kagame, the president said he did not want to hear "lectures."
Peggy Hicks, global advocacy director for Human Rights Watch, said there had been "no opposition and independent journalists were silenced" ahead of the poll.
Kagame denied this, insisting that there were four presidential candidates from four different parties, although his three nominal opponents in fact had ties to his Rwandan Patriotic Front party.
Kagame said anyone can participate in Rwandan politics as long as they do not advocate a return to the genocide that tore the country apart in 1994.
"There are things that are unacceptable here or in Rwanda, or anywhere else if they work to the detriment of society," he said.
Kagame's plea for understanding and for his performance to be put in the context of the difficulty Rwanda faces in overcoming the massacres did not convince Hicks.
"If he really wants Rwandan people's voices to be heard he should allow them to vote for all the candidates," she told AFP after the talk was over. "And if he wants Human Rights Watch to listen to the voices, then it would be nice to have visas (issued) like we used to have.
Africa Great Lakes Democracy Watch
Welcome to Africa Great Lakes Democracy Watch Blog. Our objective is to promote the institutions of democracy,social justice,Human Rights,Peace, Freedom of Expression, and Respect to humanity in Rwanda,Uganda,DR Congo, Burundi,Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya,Ethiopia, and Somalia. We strongly believe that Africa will develop if only our presidents stop being rulers of men and become leaders of citizens. We support Breaking the Silence Campaign for DR Congo since we believe the democracy in Rwanda means peace in DRC. Follow this link to learn more about the origin of the war in both Rwanda and DR Congo:http://www.rwandadocumentsproject.net/gsdl/cgi-bin/library
Showing posts with label RWANDA-HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. Show all posts
Showing posts with label RWANDA-HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. Show all posts
Tuesday, June 7, 2011
Saturday, February 12, 2011
Human Rights Watch Report: Is Diplomacy a Fig Leaf for Inaction?
President Barack Obama and President Hu Jintao of China on the South Lawn of the White House, Jan. 19, 2011. (Photo: Pete Souza / whitehouse.gov)
Saturday 12 February 2011
During his presidential campaign, then-senator Barack Obama emphasized negotiations rather than military action. The Republicans ridiculed his focus on diplomacy as naive. "Strong countries and strong presidents meet and talk with our adversaries," Obama said during an August 19 debate. "We shouldn't be afraid to do so. We've tried the other way. It didn't work."
Candidate Obama argued that the United States had to put diplomacy at the forefront of American foreign policy. But today, a leading civil rights organization is charging that one aspect of diplomacy - the language of "dialogue" and "cooperation" - is little-understood, rarely reported on and is being used by governments throughout the world as a fig leaf to conceal their tacit acceptance of egregious human rights abuses.
"The ritualistic support of 'dialogue' and 'cooperation' with repressive governments is too often an excuse for doing nothing about human rights," says Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch (HRW).
His remarks come as the organization released its "World Report 2011," a 649-page summary of human rights issues and practices in more than 90 countries and territories worldwide.
"Too many governments are accepting the rationalizations and subterfuges of repressive governments, replacing pressure to respect human rights with softer approaches such as private 'dialogue' and cooperation.' ... Instead of standing up firmly against abusive leaders," many governments "adopt policies that do not generate pressure for change."
The report was particularly critical of the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the United States of America.
The famed eloquence of US President Barack Obama "has sometimes eluded him when it comes to defending human rights," the report says. It cites as examples bilateral contexts with China, India and Indonesia.
Criticism in the report is not limited to foreign policy. For example, it says that the United States "sets a dubious world record with 2,574 minors serving life sentences at the time the report was written."
It says Obama has failed to insist that the various agencies of the US government, such as the Defense Department and various embassies, convey strong human rights messages consistently - a problem, for example, in Egypt, Indonesia and Bahrain.
The report notes that Obama "increased his focus on human rights in his second year in office, but his eloquent statements have not always been followed by concrete actions. Nor has he insisted that the various US government agencies convey strong human rights messages consistently, with the result that the Defense Department and various US embassies - in Egypt, Indonesia, and Bahrain, for example - often deliver divergent messages."
The report charges that the Obama administration, in its first year, "simply ignored the human rights conditions on the transfer of military aid to Mexico, under the Merida Initiative, even though Mexico had done nothing as required toward prosecuting abusive military officials in civilian courts."
In its second year, the report says, although the administration "did withhold a small fraction of funding, it once again certified - despite clear evidence to the contrary - that Mexico was meeting Merida's human rights requirements."
"The US also signed a funding compact with Jordan under the Millennium Challenge Corporation [MCC] even though Jordan had failed to improve its failing grades on the MCC's benchmarks for political rights and civil liberties," according to HRW.
A similar dynamic is at play in China, where Western governments seek economic opportunity as well as cooperation on a range of global and regional issues. For example, in its first year in office, the Obama administration seemed determined to downplay any issue, such as human rights, that might raise tensions in the US-China relationship.
President Obama deferred meeting with the Dalai Lama until after his trip to China and refused to meet with Chinese civil society groups during the trip, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that human rights "can't interfere" with other US interests in China.
The report declares that Obama's efforts to ingratiate himself with Chinese President Hu Jintao "gained nothing discernible while it reinforced China's view of the US as a declining power."
That weakness, the report says, "only heightened tension when, in Obama's second year in office, he and Secretary Clinton rediscovered their human rights voice on the case of Liu Xiaobo, although it remains to be seen whether they will be outspoken on rights during the January 2011 US-China summit."
The report, which was published before the Washington visit of China's president, concludes, "The Chinese government is naturally reluctant to promote human rights because it maintains such a repressive climate at home and does not want to bolster any international system for the protection of human rights that might come back to haunt it. But even China should not see turning its back on mass atrocities - a practice that, one would hope, China has moved beyond - as advancing its self-interest."
US policy toward Egypt shows that pressure can work, the report says.
"In recent years, the US government has maintained a quiet dialogue with Egypt. Beginning in 2010, however, the White House and State Department repeatedly condemned abuses, urged repeal of Egypt's emergency law, and called for free elections."
"These public calls helped to secure the release of several hundred political detainees held under the emergency law," the report says.
Egypt also responded with anger - for example, waging a lobbying campaign to stop a US Senate resolution condemning its human rights record. "The reaction was designed to scare US diplomats into resuming a quieter approach, but in fact it showed that Egypt is profoundly affected by public pressure from Washington," the report charges.
It says that, with respect to Saudi Arabia, the US government in 2005 established a "strategic dialogue" that, because of Saudi objections, "did not mention human rights as a formal subject but relegated the topic to the 'Partnership, Education, Exchange, and Human Development Working Group.'" But it notes that "even that dialogue then gradually disappeared."
The report further notes that, "While the US government contributed to keeping Iran off the board of the new UN Women agency in 2010 because of its mistreatment of women, it made no such effort with Saudi Arabia, which has an abysmal record on women but was given a seat by virtue of its financial contribution."
Western governments also have been reluctant to exert pressure for human rights on governments that they count as counterterrorism allies, the report declares.
For example, it says, the Obama administration and the Friends of Yemen, a group of states and intergovernmental organizations established in January 2010, have not conditioned military or development assistance to Yemen on human rights improvements, "despite a worsening record of abusive conduct by Yemeni security forces and continuing government crackdowns on independent journalists and largely peaceful southern separatists."
According to HRW, "One common rationalization offered for engagement without pressure is that rubbing shoulders with outsiders will somehow help to convert abusive agents of repressive governments."
The report says that the Pentagon makes that argument in the case of Uzbekistan and Sri Lanka, and that the US government adopted that line to justify resuming military aid to Indonesia's elite special forces, Kopassus, "a unit with a long history of severe abuse, including massacres in East Timor and 'disappearances' of student leaders in Jakarta."
"With respect to Kopassus," HRW says that "while the Indonesian government's human rights record has improved dramatically in recent years, a serious gap remains its failure to hold senior military officers accountable for human rights violations, even in the most high-profile cases."
In 2010, the report says, "The US relinquished the strongest lever it had by agreeing to lift a decade-old ban on direct military ties with Kopassus. The Indonesian military made some rhetorical concessions - promising to discharge convicted offenders and to take action against future offenders - but the US did not condition resumption of aid on such changes."
As a result, the report says, "Convicted offenders today remain in the military, and there is little reason to credit the military's future pledge given its poor record to date."
Trivializing the significance of pressure, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates justified resuming direct ties with Kopassus.
"Working with them further produce[s] greater gains in human rights for people than simply standing back and shouting at people," said Gates. Yet HRW notes that, "[E]ven as the US was finalizing terms with Indonesia on resumption of aid to Kopassus, an Indonesian general implicated in abductions of student leaders was promoted to deputy defense minister and a colonel implicated in other serious abuses was named deputy commander of Kopassus."
A similarly misplaced faith in rubbing shoulders with abusive forces rather than applying pressure on them informed President Obama's decision to continue military aid to a series of governments that use child soldiers - Chad, Sudan, Yemen and the Democratic Republic of Congo - despite a new US law prohibiting such aid.
In the case of Congo, for example, the military has had children in its ranks since at least 2002, and a 2010 UN report found a "dramatic increase" in the number of such children in prior years. "Instead of using a cutoff of military assistance to pressure these governments to stop using child soldiers, the Obama administration waived the law to give the US time to 'work with' the offending militaries," HRW says.
Another favorite rationale for a quiet approach, heard often in dealings with China, is that economic liberalization will lead on its own to greater political freedoms - a position maintained even after three decades in which such freedoms have not materialized.
Indeed, in 2010 the opposite occurred. In its regulation of the Internet, China began using its economic clout to try to strengthen restrictions on speech, pressing businesses to become censors on its behalf. In the end, it was a business - Google - that fought back, in part because censorship threatened its business model.
Go Daddy, the world's largest web registrar, also announced that it would no longer register domains in China because onerous government requirements forcing disclosure of customer identities made censorship easier.
Despite these efforts, China still leveraged access to its lucrative market to gain the upper hand because others in the Internet industry, such as Microsoft, did not follow Google's lead.
Conversely, the one time China backed off was when it faced concerted pressure: it apparently abandoned its "Green Dam" censoring software when the industry, civil society, governments and China's own Internet users all loudly protested. Even Google's license to operate a search engine in China was renewed, casting further doubt on the idea that a public critique of China's human rights practices would inevitably hurt business.
Ironically, some of the governments most opposed to using pressure to promote human rights have no qualms about using pressure to deflect human rights criticism.
China, for example, pulled out all the stops in an ultimately unsuccessful effort to suppress a report to the UN Security Council on the discovery of Chinese weaponry in Darfur despite an arms embargo. Sri Lanka did the same in an unsuccessful effort to quash a UN advisory panel on accountability for war crimes committed during its armed conflict with the Tamil Tigers.
China also mounted a major lobbying effort to prevent the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to imprisoned Chinese writer and human rights activist Liu Xiaobo. When that failed, it tried unsuccessfully to discourage governments from attending the award ceremony in Norway. China made a similar effort to block a proposed UN commission of inquiry into war crimes committed in Burma.
But HRW saves its harshest criticism for the UN and the EU. The report excoriates "the failure of the expected champions of human rights to respond" to human rights violations around the world.
HRW says the use of "dialogue and cooperation in lieu of pressure has emerged with a vengeance at the UN, from Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to many members of the Human Rights Council."
In addition, the report says, "leading democracies of the global South, such as South Africa, India, and Brazil, have promoted quiet demarches as a preferred response to repression."
Recent illustrations include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) tepid response to Burmese repression, the UN's deferential attitude toward Sri Lankan wartime atrocities and India's pliant policy toward Burma and Sri Lanka, according to the report.
"The UN Human Rights Council has been especially timid, with many countries refusing to vote for resolutions aimed at a particular country. In an extreme example, rather than condemn Sri Lanka for the brutal abuses against civilians in the final months of the conflict with the Tamil Tigers, the council congratulated Sri Lanka," HRW said.
Although the EU's partnership and cooperation agreements with other countries are routinely conditioned on basic respect for human rights, it has concluded a significant trade agreement and pursued a full-fledged partnership and cooperation agreement with Turkmenistan, a severely repressive government, without conditioning on human rights improvements or engaging in any serious efforts to secure improvements in advance, the report said.
The EU opened accession discussions with Serbia despite its failure to apprehend and surrender for trial Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb wartime military leader and an internationally indicted war crimes suspect, an act that was regarded as a key benchmark for beginning the discussions. The EU also lifted sanctions imposed on Uzbekistan after security forces massacred hundreds in 2005 in the city of Andijan, even though the Uzbek government took no steps to fill any of the EU criteria required for lifting the sanctions.
"Dialogue and cooperation have their place, but the burden should be on the abusive government to show a genuine willingness to improve," Roth said. "In the absence of demonstrated political will, public pressure should be the default response to repression."
The report said that if members of the UN Human Rights Council want dialogue and cooperation to be effective in upholding human rights, they should limit use of these tools to governments that have demonstrated a political will to improve. "But whether out of calculation or cowardice, many Council members promote dialogue and cooperation as a universal prescription without regard to whether a government has the political will to curtail its abusive behavior," HRW said.
These countries thus resist tests for determining whether a government's asserted interest in cooperation is a ploy to avoid pressure or a genuine commitment to improvement - tests that might look to the government's willingness to acknowledge its human rights failings, welcome UN investigators to examine the nature of the problem, prescribe solutions and embark upon reforms.
"The enemies of human rights enforcement oppose critical resolutions even on governments that clearly fail these tests, such as Burma, Iran, North Korea, Sri Lanka, and Sudan," the report said.
"Similar problems arise at the UN General Assembly," the report says. "As the Burmese military reinforced its decades-long rule with sham elections designed to give it a civilian facade, a campaign got under way to intensify pressure by launching an international commission of inquiry to examine the many war crimes committed in the country's long-running armed conflict."
A commission of inquiry, the report says, "would be an excellent tool for showing that such atrocities could no longer be committed with impunity. It would also create an incentive for newer members of the military-dominated government to avoid the worst abuses of the past."
Yet some member states have refused to endorse a commission of inquiry on the "spurious grounds that it would not work without the cooperation of the Burmese junta."
EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, in failing to embrace this tool, said, "Ideally, we should aim at ensuring a measure of cooperation from the national authorities."
Similarly, a German Foreign Ministry spokeswoman said that, to help advance human rights in the country, it is "crucial to find some co-operation mechanism with the [Burmese] national authorities."
Yet obtaining such cooperation from the Burmese military in the absence of further pressure is a pipe dream, the report says.
Another favorite form of cooperation is a formal intergovernmental dialogue on human rights, such as those that many governments conduct with China and that the EU maintains with a range of repressive countries, including the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.
"Authoritarian governments understandably welcome these dialogues because they remove the spotlight from human rights discussions," HRW says.
With such dialogues, the public, including domestic activists, is "left in the dark, as are most government officials outside the foreign ministry."
But Western governments also often cite the existence of such dialogues as justification for not speaking concretely about human rights violations and remedies in more meaningful settings - as Sweden did, for example, during its EU presidency when asked why human rights had not featured more prominently at the EU-Central Asia ministerial conference.
The UN and EU are accused of "cowardice" for claiming to tackle human rights abuses in places like China or Uzbekistan through quiet dialogue and cooperation, the report said.
Highlighting its claim, the HRW report was issued in Brussels the same day the EU hosted controversial Uzbek President Islam Karimov despite protests from campaigners.
Roth, as leader of the New-York-based nongovernmental organization, was sharply critical of "the failure of the expected champions of human rights to respond" to violations in an introduction to the 600-page report covering 100-plus regimes.
Roth sees the fundamental error made by Ban and other leading voices was to place the accent on quiet diplomacy, which he says is often a euphemism for "other interests at stake."
Roth cites a "tepid" response from Asian partners to repression in Myanmar. The report says the Burmese junta's release of democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi on November 23 was preceded by no significant steps on 2,100 other political prisoners.
The UN is criticized for adopting a "deferential" attitude towards Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa, alongside Myanmar's Than Shwe or Sudan leader Omar al-Bashir. The report said Ban placed "undue faith" in the impact of his corridor diplomacy.
The EU's top diplomat, the much-criticized English baroness Ashton, is said to hide behind an "obsequious approach to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan" where large energy interests dominate trade and political links.
Ashton's "quiet dialogue and cooperation often look like acquiescence" leading rights defenders to "sense indifference rather than solidarity," Roth wrote in a column for the International Herald Tribune in advance of the report's release.
Britain, France and Germany are all cited as appeasing Beijing.
The obsession with dialogue and cooperation is particularly intense at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, where many of the members insist that the Council should practice "cooperation, not condemnation."
The report says that, "A key form of pressure at the Council is the ability to send fact-finders to expose what abuses were committed and to hold governments accountable for not curtailing abuses. One important medium for these tools is a resolution aimed at a particular country or situation. Yet many governments on the Council eschew any country resolution designed to generate pressure (except in the case of the Council's perennial pariah, Israel)."
"Near-universal cowardice," meanwhile, marks efforts at confronting China's "deepening crackdown on basic liberties," as huge yuan investments - whether in African natural resources or in US and eurozone public debt - ensure silence is the preferred approach.
"The credibility of the EU as a force for human rights around the world also rests on its willingness to address human rights abuses by its own member states. With a record of discrimination and rising intolerance against migrants, Muslims, Roma, and others, inadequate access to asylum, and abusive counterterrorism measures, member states and EU institutions need to show greater political commitment to ensure that respect for human rights at home matches the EU's rhetoric abroad," the report charges.
The report cites recent examples of failure to exert pressure. These include the EU's "obsequious approach" toward Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the West's "soft reaction" to certain favored African autocrats, such as Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, and the "near-universal cowardice in confronting China's deepening crackdown on basic liberties."
It adds that the most effective support for human rights in China in 2010 came from the Norwegian Nobel committee's awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to imprisoned Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo.
Prior to the recent visit of President Hu of China, there was concerted pressure from Obama's left wing urging him to launch a full frontal attack on China's human rights record.
To most of those on the left of the Democratic Party, Obama's attack was far from "full frontal." On the other hand, it was obvious that the American president intended to call attention to China's pitiful human rights record and to keep the subject front and center while negotiations on other important issues were proceeding. The issue was now "on the table," and was not going to be swept under the rug.
As a New York Times editorial noted, prior to Hu's arrival, Obama "invited human rights advocates to the White House for a meeting on China." Obama raised the issue from the very beginning of the state visit. It is reported that he also had a "very serious" discussion of human rights with Hu during a private dinner in the White House.
Many observers believe the president didn't go far enough, but that he went as far as he could. But far fewer seem to believe Obama's candor will have any impact on China's domestic policies, at least not in the short termRelated articles
- U.S., UN among those weak on rights abuses: group (nationalpost.com)
- UN rejects rights 'coward' claim (bbc.co.uk)
- What's Next for Egypt: "Mubarakism Without Mubarak"? (mydd.com)
- Rights group says democracies ignore abuses (sfgate.com)
- Rights group says democracies ignore abuses (ctv.ca)
- Rights group says democracies ignore abuses (seattletimes.nwsource.com)
- CAMBODIA: Lessons from Tunis and Cairo that premier Hun Sen and Cambodian democrats can learn (ki-media.blogspot.com)
- Rights group says democracies are ignoring abuses (theglobeandmail.com)
- U.S. Senator Asks Facebook For Anonymity Option (allfacebook.com)
- U.S. stakes out revised China stance (politico.com)
Saturday, October 16, 2010
The Chronology of Hutu Massacre in Mbandaka on May13, 1997 by the RPF-AFDL Soldiers
SOURCE:HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
VII. WHO IS IN CHARGE: TOWARDS ESTABLISHING RESPONSIBILITY
During a July 1997 interview with the Washington Post, Rwandan Vice-President Paul Kagame claimed that the Rwandan government had planned and led the military campaign that dispersed the refugee camps in Eastern Congo and ousted former President Mobutu.[86] According to the Washington Post, Kagame was unequivocal concerning his objectives:The impetus for the war, Kagame said, was the Hutu refugee camps. Hutu militiamen used the camps as bases from which they launched raids into Rwanda, and Kagame said the Hutus had been buying weapons and preparing a full-scale invasion of Rwanda.
Kagame said the battle plan as formulated by him and his advisors was simple. The first goal was to 'dismantle the camps.' The second was to 'destroy the structure' of the Hutu army and militia units based in and around the camps either by bringing the Hutu combatants back to Rwanda and 'dealing with them here or scattering them.' [87]Kagame's third objective was to topple Mobutu. Congolese President Kabila confirmed Rwanda's military assistance in Congo during an official visit to Kigali on September 9, 1997, when he publicly thanked Rwanda for their help during the war.[88]
These statements lend support to the numerous testimonies taken by Human Rights Watch/FIDH from Congolese, refugees, and expatriates in Congo regarding the presence of Rwandan and other foreign troops in Congo during the war. Similarly, Kagame's stated objective of destroying "the structure" of the ex-FAR provides a possible explanation for the active pursuit of refugees, former military, and militia across Congolese territory to areas of minor strategic importance, such as Mbandaka.
Despite the public recognition of military involvement, both Kabila and Kagame have denied that any civilian massacres took place by troops under their command.[89] Both during the war and up to the present, however, the identities of many commanding officers and strategists of the ADFL and its allies were kept secret. Throughout the seven-month military campaign, senior officers in the field were often out of uniform and many used only their first names in public. Similarly, ranks were apparently confused or intentionally simplified to avoid identification of the military hierarchy: many officers of Katangese or Angolan origin were given or assumed the rank of "general", while numerous Ugandan and Rwandan officers were known only as "commander" or "colonel" followed by their first name only. It is possible that many of these first names that were used in public are pseudonyms.
Regional power structures that reflect the pattern in Kinshasa have been put into place in many of the provinces. In several regions, governors from the political opposition or from local ethnic groups have been installed, at times through simple hand-raising elections in stadiums. Despite this apparent democratic method, Congolese community leaders and civil servants, international humanitarian workers, and U.N. officials claimed that civilian authorities have had little power in decision-making, especially regarding refugee issues, and that important questions were handled by military authorities.
In several provinces, Katangese generals have been installed as regional military commanders, seconded by Rwandan or Ugandan officers in charge of operations and questions related to refugees and security. Tension often exists between the various military factions, especially between those of Rwandan or Ugandan origin and those from Angola, Katanga, or non-Kinyarwanda speaking groups.[90] One Katangese general, allegedly responsible for the province of Equateur, stated flatly to a Congolese humanitarian official that he did not handle refugee issues.[91]
The identities of leading officers and strategists may have been intentionally hidden by the ADFL in order to protect those responsible for war crimes. Nevertheless, some became known to embassies in Kinshasa, humanitarian organizations, and Congolese, as either strategists or field commanders, or both. Lt. Colonel James Kabarebe, often known as Commander"James," or "James Kabare," was described by a U.S. Embassy official in Kinshasa as the most powerful commander in Congo and a principal strategist during the seven-month war.[92] An English-speaker, James claims to have grandparents from Rutshuru in North-Kivu, and has spent time in Uganda. James was active in the field during the war, telling an embassy official in Kinshasa how he changed the tactics of the ADFL after taking Kisangani. He was reportedly the field commander for the decisive battle at Kenge just prior to the fall of Kinshasa and was subsequently responsible for troops taking the capital.
James continued to play a key role in the military structure in Kinshasa and is likely the most powerful officer in Congo as of this writing. He participated in the first official talks between President Kabila and U.S. Ambassador Bill Richardson in Lubumbashi in early June 1997. Rwandan Vice-President Kagame acknowledged that James was a key commander operating in Congo during the war and had been assigned to organize the new Congolese army.[93]
Other officers were seen regularly by many observers in areas where massacres took place. Below is a list of some of these individuals who may have been involved in, or been aware of, the organization or execution of civilian massacres in Congo. The list is incomplete, and likely represents a small fraction of those involved. Human Rights Watch/FIDH publishes the list not in an effort to accuse the below of war crimes but to insist that investigations are initiated by appropriate governments to clarify the role of each of these individuals and, equally important, other parties implicated in the massacres.
Commander "David"
Referred to as commander or major, originally from Rwanda or the Rutshuru area of North-Kivu. A fluent English and Kinyarwanda speaker, David has said that he left Rwanda at a young age to study in Uganda. By some reports, he also studied in Canada. According to numerous testimonies, he is approximately thirty years old, six foot one inch tall, thin, and has longish hair, very dark skin, and features characteristic of many ethnic Tutsi. David is a member of the RPA.[94]David played an important role in the fall of Goma on October 31, 1997. Expatriates in Goma at the time were instructed by UNHCR to refer to "Major David" in the event that they encountered the RPA during their evacuation.[95]
David was in Beni in November 1996, in Isiro in early 1997, and finally in Kisangani in April 1997 during the period when access was cut to refugee camps and large-scale massacres were taking place.[96] David was in Mbandaka on May 13, 1997, where eyewitnesses report over 1,300 people killed by ADFL troops and their allies.[97] David told several sources in Mbandaka how he had made the journey from Kisangani to Mbandaka on foot.
After the departure of Commandant Wilson and Commandant Godfrey (see below) from Mbandaka, David claimed to be responsible for Equateur. David was described by many who had dealings with him as being very intelligent, helpful, and a disciplinarian. On at least one occasion, he ordered a soldier under his command to be flogged in public for an alleged rape.[98] In an informal conversation with colleagues, he mentioned how easy it was to kill:
It's so easy to kill someone; you just go-[pointing his finger like a pistol]-and it's finished.[99]
General Gaston Muyango
A native of the Katanga region, General Muyango is reportedly a Tshiluba, Lingala, and Portuguese speaker. Muyango was at numerous locations between Kisangani and Mbandaka shortly after killings took place. He arrived in Mbandaka on May 13, 1997 where over 1,300 refugees were killed by ADFL troops and their allies. In Mbandaka, he lived in ex-Minister Eduard Mokolo's house on Avenue Itela.[100]Despite his rank of general, Muyango was described by numerous Congolese and expatriates as having little power in Mbandaka. Humanitarian workers claimed that for important decisions they were referred to Commanders David, Godfrey Kabanda, or Wilson. Muyango stated in several private conversations that he didn't deal with refugee issues. He was reportedly often in conflict with these commanders and left Mbandaka around the third week in June.
Commander "Godfrey" Kabanda
Commander "Godfrey" was reportedly either the top commander or a commander of operations for the ADFL in Mbandaka on May 13, 1997 during the Mbandaka massacre. He is described as short and robust and having facial features characteristic of some Tutsi. Godfrey claimed to be the military commander for the Equateur region. According to press reports, Godfrey denied that any massacre had taken place in Mbandaka but spoke openly of how many of his soldiers were Tutsi survivors of Hutu refugee attacks on Congolese Tutsi in eastern Congo in 1996.[101]Godfrey left Mbandaka within a few weeks after the May 13, 1997 massacre.
Lt. Colonel or Col. Cyiago (Kiago)
Often seen just behind the front lines during the war, a Lt. Colonel or Colonel with a name close to Cyiago (or "Kiago") was responsible for some of the ADFL troops on the road between Kisangani and Mbandaka, an area where massacres took place. A Kinyarwanda and Kiswahili speaker, Cyiago is tall, dark, thin and reportedly used an interpreter for his communications. Cyiago has been accused of being involved in the abduction of at least one Congolese civil servant who had spoken out concerning the killings in Equateur. Cyiago is a member of the RPA.[102]Commander or Lt. Colonel "Wilson"
Wilson was at or near sites in South-Kivu, Haut-Congo, and Equateur during periods when massacres took place. Several reports indicate that he may be responsible for a special unit of RPA, composed primarily of experienced Rwandan soldiers, that has been implicated in several large massacres in Congo.[103]Wilson was in Kisangani during military interventions that took place at Biaro, Kasese I, and Kasese II that likely resulted in thousands of refugee deaths. According to aid workers in Kisangani, Wilson was responsible for training and inciting the local Congolese population south of Kisangani to launch attacks against refugees. He was a commander for RPA operations in Mbandaka on May 13, 1997, when a massacre took place. He was in Mbandaka until approximately May 24, 1997 when he was reportedly replaced by Commander David.[104]
Wilson has striking facial scarification and, in addition to English, speaks the Kiswahili typical of Uganda. He claims to be from Uvira, in eastern Congo and is described as professional and intelligent by many who dealt with him on refugee issues. Wilson reportedly often went by the alias "Khadafi" in Rwanda as an RPA officer.[105]
Colonel "Richard"
According to members of the ADFL military in Mbandaka, Colonel Richard, a member of the RPA, was one of the commanders responsible for operations at Mbandaka during the massacre May 13, 1997.[106]Major "Jackson" Nkurunziza (or Nziza)
An officer reported to be Major Nkurunziza (also referred to as Colonel or Commander "Jackson") was seen by numerous sources in Maniema, South-Kivu and Haut-Congo near sites where refugees were concentrated and/or massacres took place. Jackson, according to Congolese and aid workers also known as "the exterminator," speaks the Kiswahili of Uganda as well as fluent English and Kinyarwanda.[107]In early April, Jackson was a commander in the Shabunda area where he told aid workers that his mission was to eliminate ex-FAR and Interahamwe. During this period, humanitarian sources saw mass graves and decomposing bodies of what they state were civilian refugees in the Shabunda and neighboring areas. Corroborating sources state that Jackson was at barriers south of Kisangani during mid- to late April 1997 when massacres allegedly were taking place at refugee camps in the area. He was in Kisangani until mid-May and later in South-Kivu and Maniema as late as July 1997 during a period in which UNHCR was organizing voluntary repatriation.[108] He was seen again in Kisangani as recently as early September 1997.[109]
Commander "Joseph"
Commander "Joseph" or "Yusef", according to witnesses from the Masisi area,was in charge of ADFL troops based in the village of Rukwi in North-Kivu in late 1996. Joseph, reportedly a captain from the Burundian army, has been accused by eyewitnesses of commanding troops who participated in massacres in the villages of Nyakariba and Nyamitaba in late December 1996.[110]Colonel "Dominic Yugo"
According to testimony from local Congolese NGOs, countless journalists, and international humanitarian workers, a commanding officer among Mobutu's mercenaries in the Kisangani area by the name of Colonel "Dominic Yugo" was responsible for numerous abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. Yugo, a Serb, personally executed and tortured Congolese civilians suspected of collaborating with the ADFL. On March 8, 1997, on a road near the Kisangani airport, Yugo shot and killed two Protestant missionaries, with bibles in hand, accusing them of being ADFL spies.[111] A beef importer from Goma was arrested by mercenaries on February 23, 1997 under Yugo's command and later described how he and others in detention were tortured and subject to inhumane treatment by Yugo himself.[112]According to an aid official, Yugo claimed responsibility for air attacks on Walikale and Bukavu, incidents which resulted in numerous civilian deaths and casualties.[113]
[86]John Pomfret, "Rwanda Planned and Led the Attack on Zaire," Washington Post, July 9, 1997.
[87]Ibid.
[88]Integrated Regional Information Network, Update 245, September 10, 1997.
[89]In his interview with the Washington Post, Kagame does not deny the possibility of "individual atrocities".
[90]In addition to numerous reports describing this tension, three separate shooting incidents in three different provinces occurred between Rwandan and Katangan elements during the Human Rights Watch/FIDH stay in Congo. At least four military deaths resulted.
[91]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, Mbandaka, August 20, 1997.
[92]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, U.S. Embassy, Kinshasa, August 22, 1997.
[93]John Pomfret, "Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo," Washington Post, July 9, 1997.
[94]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews in Kinshasa and Goma, August 1997.
[95]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview with aid workers in Goma, November 1996.
[96]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews with U.S. Embassy official, Kinshasa, August 22, 1997, and aid workers in Goma, August 28, 1997.
[97]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews with development workers of Mbandaka, Kinshasa, August 5, 1997.
[98]Human Rights Watch/FIDH telephone interviews with aid workers formerly in Mbandaka, July 1997.
[99]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview with colleague of David, Congo, August 27, 1997.
[100]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews with eyewitnesses between Kisangani and Mbandaka, August 1997.
[101] Colin Nickerson, "Refugee Massacre Unfolds in Congo," Boston Globe, June 6, 1997.
[102]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews, first village, Kinshasa, and Nairobi, July and August, 1997.
[103]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews with journalists and aid workers in the field, July and September 1997.
[104]Ibid.
[105]Human Rights Watch/FIDH telephone interviews with U.N. officials in Europe, July 1997.
[106]Human Rights Watch/FIDH telephone interview with journalist in Washington, September 30, 1997.
[107]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews, Congo, Nairobi, and New York, July-September 1997.
[108]Ibid
[109]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews with journalists, aid workers, and U.N. officials, July-September 1997.
[110]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews, Nairobi, March and August 1997.
[111]James McKinley, "Serb Who Went to Defend Zaire Spread Death and Horror Instead," New York Times, March 19, 1997.
[112]Ibid.
[113]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, UNHCR official, September 1997.
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- Identify the Congo killers and bring them to justice | Reed Brody (guardian.co.uk)
- Georgianne Nienaber: DR Congo: War Criminal Ntaganda and Rwandan Security Agents Accused of Assassinations (huffingtonpost.com)
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Friday, October 15, 2010
Rwanda: Protect Rights and Safety of Opposition Leaders
SOURCE: Human Rights Watch
Victoire Ingabire Re-arrested, Bernard Ntaganda in Serious Condition
- Victoire Ingabire.© Getty Images
- The police should grant Ingabire access to visitors and should respect her rights to due process. If she is to be charged, it should be on the basis of solid evidence, not as a punishment for her criticisms of the government.Rona Peligal, Africa director at Human Rights Watch

(New York) - The Rwandan government should fully respect the rights of opposition party members and allow them to carry out their legitimate activities without fear for their safety, Human Rights Watch said today.
Human Rights Watch issued its statement in response to the re-arrest of Victoire Ingabire, president of the opposition party FDU-Inkingi, and the transfer from prison to a hospital of Bernard Ntaganda, president of another opposition party, the PS-Imberakuri, both on October 14, 2010. Both parties have been critical of the Rwandan government and were prevented from participating in the presidential elections in August.
Ntaganda was arrested on June 24 and has remained in detention awaiting trial. He had been on a hunger strike to protest his treatment in prison. On October 14, he was rushed from Kigali Central Prison to the Centre Hospitalier de Kigali (CHK), Kigali's main hospital. His relatives and friends reported that he was in intensive care, but were not given specific information on his condition. Some of them were able to see him briefly in hospital and reported that he was very weak. That evening, he was transferred to King Faysal Hospital, also in Kigali.
"We are worried about Bernard Ntaganda's condition," said Rona Peligal, Africa director at Human Rights Watch. "The authorities should ensure he has access to appropriate and prompt medical treatment and that family and friends are allowed to visit him. They should also ensure that if his condition suggests evidence of abuse, for example that he has been ill-treated or attempts have been made to force feed him or retaliate against him for his hunger strike, this is immediately investigated."
In the days preceding Ntaganda's transfer to the hospital, friends had been refused permission to visit him in prison. On their most recent attempt to visit on October 13, prison officials reportedly told them that they would be able to see him on October 15 - by which time he had been transferred to the hospital.
The authorities should ensure that proper medical information about the condition of his health and the treatment he is receiving is available to his family, Human Rights Watch said.
The arrest of Victoire Ingabire came after police had surrounded her house for several days. Then on October 14, they came to her house and took her to the Criminal Investigations Department (CID), where she was questioned in the presence of her lawyer. She was then transferred to Kicukiro police station, where she remains. Colleagues who brought her food and water on the morning of October 15 were not allowed to see her.
According to police statements, Ingabire's interrogation relates to testimony from a former commander of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda, FDLR). The FDLR is an armed group active in the Democratic Republic of Congo, some of whose members took part in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The commander, who was arrested on October 13, allegedly implicated Ingabire in activities to form a new armed group.
"The police should grant Ingabire access to visitors and should respect her rights to due process," Peligal said. "If she is to be charged, it should be on the basis of solid evidence, not as a punishment for her criticisms of the government."
Background
Members of the PS-Imberakuri and the FDU-Inkingi were subjected to persistent harassment and intimidation in the period leading up to presidential elections in August. Neither party was able to field candidates in the elections, which the incumbent, Paul Kagame, won with 93 per cent of the vote.
On June 24, police arrested Ntaganda, raided his house and the party office, and took away documents and other belongings. Ntaganda was accused of several offenses, including endangering national security, and inciting ethnic divisions (in relation to his public statements criticizing government policies) and organizing demonstrations without official authorization.
Ingabire was questioned by the police numerous times in the first half of the year. In March, police stopped her at Kigali airport and prevented her from leaving the country. In April, she was arrested and brought before a court to face accusations of "genocide ideology," "divisionism," and collaboration with the FDLR. She was released on bail, with charges still pending, and is not allowed to travel outside the capital.
Several other members of the PS-Imberakuri and the FDU-Inkingi were arrested in June and July, some when they attempted to hold a demonstration on June 24. Some were released; others remain in detention. Several were ill-treated by the police. They were beaten and kicked, and were kept handcuffed to other prisoners, even while eating and going to the toilet.
Members of a third opposition party, the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda, also received threats in the pre-election period. The party's vice-president, André Kagwa Rwisereka, was brutally murdered in July; his mutilated body was found outside the town of Butare. The circumstances of his death remain unclear. Police arrested a suspect but released him a few days later. No further judicial action has been taken.
Human Rights Watch issued its statement in response to the re-arrest of Victoire Ingabire, president of the opposition party FDU-Inkingi, and the transfer from prison to a hospital of Bernard Ntaganda, president of another opposition party, the PS-Imberakuri, both on October 14, 2010. Both parties have been critical of the Rwandan government and were prevented from participating in the presidential elections in August.
Ntaganda was arrested on June 24 and has remained in detention awaiting trial. He had been on a hunger strike to protest his treatment in prison. On October 14, he was rushed from Kigali Central Prison to the Centre Hospitalier de Kigali (CHK), Kigali's main hospital. His relatives and friends reported that he was in intensive care, but were not given specific information on his condition. Some of them were able to see him briefly in hospital and reported that he was very weak. That evening, he was transferred to King Faysal Hospital, also in Kigali.
"We are worried about Bernard Ntaganda's condition," said Rona Peligal, Africa director at Human Rights Watch. "The authorities should ensure he has access to appropriate and prompt medical treatment and that family and friends are allowed to visit him. They should also ensure that if his condition suggests evidence of abuse, for example that he has been ill-treated or attempts have been made to force feed him or retaliate against him for his hunger strike, this is immediately investigated."
In the days preceding Ntaganda's transfer to the hospital, friends had been refused permission to visit him in prison. On their most recent attempt to visit on October 13, prison officials reportedly told them that they would be able to see him on October 15 - by which time he had been transferred to the hospital.
The authorities should ensure that proper medical information about the condition of his health and the treatment he is receiving is available to his family, Human Rights Watch said.
The arrest of Victoire Ingabire came after police had surrounded her house for several days. Then on October 14, they came to her house and took her to the Criminal Investigations Department (CID), where she was questioned in the presence of her lawyer. She was then transferred to Kicukiro police station, where she remains. Colleagues who brought her food and water on the morning of October 15 were not allowed to see her.
According to police statements, Ingabire's interrogation relates to testimony from a former commander of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda, FDLR). The FDLR is an armed group active in the Democratic Republic of Congo, some of whose members took part in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The commander, who was arrested on October 13, allegedly implicated Ingabire in activities to form a new armed group.
"The police should grant Ingabire access to visitors and should respect her rights to due process," Peligal said. "If she is to be charged, it should be on the basis of solid evidence, not as a punishment for her criticisms of the government."
Background
Members of the PS-Imberakuri and the FDU-Inkingi were subjected to persistent harassment and intimidation in the period leading up to presidential elections in August. Neither party was able to field candidates in the elections, which the incumbent, Paul Kagame, won with 93 per cent of the vote.
On June 24, police arrested Ntaganda, raided his house and the party office, and took away documents and other belongings. Ntaganda was accused of several offenses, including endangering national security, and inciting ethnic divisions (in relation to his public statements criticizing government policies) and organizing demonstrations without official authorization.
Ingabire was questioned by the police numerous times in the first half of the year. In March, police stopped her at Kigali airport and prevented her from leaving the country. In April, she was arrested and brought before a court to face accusations of "genocide ideology," "divisionism," and collaboration with the FDLR. She was released on bail, with charges still pending, and is not allowed to travel outside the capital.
Several other members of the PS-Imberakuri and the FDU-Inkingi were arrested in June and July, some when they attempted to hold a demonstration on June 24. Some were released; others remain in detention. Several were ill-treated by the police. They were beaten and kicked, and were kept handcuffed to other prisoners, even while eating and going to the toilet.
Members of a third opposition party, the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda, also received threats in the pre-election period. The party's vice-president, André Kagwa Rwisereka, was brutally murdered in July; his mutilated body was found outside the town of Butare. The circumstances of his death remain unclear. Police arrested a suspect but released him a few days later. No further judicial action has been taken.
Related articles
- Rwandan police arrest opposition leader (telegraph.co.uk)
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- Rwandan police arrest top opposition leader (foxnews.com)
- Rwandan Police Arrest Top Opposition Leader (nytimes.com)
- Rwandan police arrest top opposition leader (sfgate.com)
- Rwandan president expected to win election handily; critics decry crackdown on opposition (foxnews.com)
- Georgianne Nienaber: DR Congo: War Criminal Ntaganda and Rwandan Security Agents Accused of Assassinations (huffingtonpost.com)
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