Africa Great Lakes Democracy Watch



Welcome to
Africa Great Lakes Democracy Watch Blog. Our objective is to promote the institutions of democracy,social justice,Human Rights,Peace, Freedom of Expression, and Respect to humanity in Rwanda,Uganda,DR Congo, Burundi,Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya,Ethiopia, and Somalia. We strongly believe that Africa will develop if only our presidents stop being rulers of men and become leaders of citizens. We support Breaking the Silence Campaign for DR Congo since we believe the democracy in Rwanda means peace in DRC. Follow this link to learn more about the origin of the war in both Rwanda and DR Congo:http://www.rwandadocumentsproject.net/gsdl/cgi-bin/library


Showing posts with label RWANDA-UGANDA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label RWANDA-UGANDA. Show all posts

Monday, January 3, 2011

Hosting Africa’s TV King – Shaka Ssali

From Ombui
As the Voice of America was marking 10 years November since the inception of Straight Talk Africa – a television talk show famous in the continent, my mind is illuminated interviewing the host Dr Shaka Ssali early 2006.
Photo/VOA
Dr Shaka Ssali
Dr Shaka Ssali, host of Straight Talk Africa.
After welcoming him to 107 Campus FM studio (a students’ radio), the tall, built and dark complexioned renowned international journalist hits back jokingly “I have no clinic…” He hates the ‘Dr’ title an indication of being humble – a quality a journalist must have.
Being one of the serious interviews to conduct as a journalism student, I was tensed to host the Africa’s TV King. His voice was clear and powerful. He looked straight into my eyes. I don’t remember him blinking. On the other side, the studio mobile phone tossed with heated questions.
Anyway, the interview went on in a tiny studio double the size of an African toilet. I left the door open after-all the air conditioner was down. I didn’t want my guest to boil inside his grey suit with tiny white vertical stripes.
Shaka holds a doctorate in cross cultural communication and history from UCLA in California, USA. He received several journalism honors and a former Ford Foundation fellow.
This interview was not only a “round-table” for Mass Communication students to air myriad questions, but Makerere University, Kampala at large.
His purposed-visit to Uganda was to highlight the role of the media in building a much desired democratic space to journalists and journalism students. He emphasized that democracy as a process needs time and participation of the society. “It is not an incident or an event.”
Before the interview, there were “allegations” that he (Shaka) was an agent for Uganda’s leading opposition party, Forum for Democratic Change (FDC). He later clarified that he was not engaged in any political activity or with a political party (FDC) whatsoever.
Congratulations Shaka Ssali and Straight Talk Africa for making 10 years of igniting democracy in the black continent.
Be “better and not bitter” as you listen to the interview with Dr Shaka Ssali on 107 Campus FM – Uganda, 18th January, 2006.
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Interview with VOA’s Shaka Ssali on Problem of Child Soldiers, Parts 7-8

Part 7: Shaka Ssali – the importance of education click here
Narrator:
Dr. Shaka Ssali
Former child soldiers require above all the opportunity for education. Shaka Ssali is living proof of the transformational power of knowledge. Through education, Ssali has himself become a positive role model for others. Born in Uganda, Ssali was enlisted in the army when he 16 years old as a cadet officer. After almost five years he had risen to the rank of lieutenant. But even as a young child, he says, he had a burning desire for knowledge.
Shaka Ssali:
I was a news hound, and from the time I was a kid interacting with the cinema I developed an interest in reading magazines. I would about humor, you know, about Vietnam, and that kind of stuff.
Narrator:
The 1960s in Africa were times of political and social change. Through magazines, Ssali was able to become an observer of this change and develop understanding. He learned about events and issues such as apartheid in South Africa and the role of Nelson Mandela, the revolution in Rhodesia and Ian Smith, and the other key players and struggles of the time.
Shaka Ssali:
I sort of looked at them as if in fact they were like a bible. One of them was called Africa magazine; another was called Drum magazine. Drum was published out of Soetto in South Africa, and Africa magazine was published out of London. I would do anything in the world to make sure I had unfettered access to a copy. To know what was going on. Through that, my mind was able to be carried you know, throughout the continent basically. And in the process, I started developing an interest in some day becoming a journalist. I loved the idea of having a byline, by so and so…
Narrator:
After his time in the Ugandan Army, Ssali came to the United States in 1976, where he sought and received political asylum. He attended the State University of New York to pursue his studies.
Shaka Ssali:
Eventually, when I come to the United States, I have made up my mind. I really want to be a journalist. So I go to the State University of New York. They didn't have a journalism major, but they had a communications and rhetoric major. Then I start studying about Africa. I developed a passion for Africa.
Narrator:
During his journalism studies, Ssali authored stories in a student magazine containing harsh criticism for the African leaders of time – such as Uganda's Idi Amin, Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta and Mobutu of Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Shaka Ssali:
So I found myself somehow associating myself with those forces frankly that were promoting change. And in the process, I realize that each time I wrote an article, I got very, very positive feedback from a lot of people, and that encouraged me enormously.

Narrator:
After a disappointing experience as an intern at Newsday in New York, Ssali went back to school, this time in Los Angeles at the University of California, or UCLA.
Shaka Ssali:
For me I was very ambitious in the sense that I looked at myself someday as someone that would be like a research reporter on Africa, analyzing Africa. I sort of reasoned that if I went to graduate school, picked up higher degrees and what have you, developed my writing skills, that New York Times or Time magazine would find me irresistible. I went into some classes of history and philosophy and I became extremely bored. So I went to go check out some of the courses in the film school. And they had some of the courses which they called non-Western films. And I started attending those courses because I thought that coming from where I do, you have very high rates of illiteracy. And therefore, the best really medium of communication for my people, I reasoned, would be using the moving picture. So I felt that yeah, this was going to be a great opportunity for me. I was going to do documentary film making, to empower those people that can neither write nor read – that's how I looked at it.
Part 8: Shaka Ssali – thanks and contribution
Narrator:
Today, Ssali is a popular radio talk show host with Voice of America. His programs have loyal followings across Africa, Europe and the United States.
Shaka Ssali:
I have two programs that I host. One is called Straight Talk Africa, a weekly, live, international call-in talk show. It is a program that is really designed to empower the audience. It empowers the audience in the sense that the audience has the opportunity to call in, give their telephone number, especially from Africa where they do not have the collect facility, then the operator calls them back and they ask a question, they ask it live. That is one of the real opportunities for example that, even in Tanzania, one can actually call into the show and get the opportunity to interact with his President, something that is very rare. It is also live and therefore most of the interaction really is something close to being authentic, you know, it's not predetermined and what have you, and so it really makes a lot of difference, especially with the latest technological developments of the cell phone. You can literally go anywhere, in the villages, you know.
Narrator:
Ssali's contribution to understanding, by telling his own story through his writing and radio shows have given him a special place in many African communities. He himself tells us that the children in Africa, where he came from, have the potential to make great contributions themselves. He told us how he sees that potential through an example.  
Shaka Ssali:
And then I was in Kenya, I went to visit former Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi. And he's a guy who used to tell me that – whenever I would ask him what is the single most important decision that you have made during your presidency, you know things like that, he would tell me education, education. How he has built many schools, he has contributed land for people to build schools in their communities, and so I took him on. I said: you know you used to tell me, Mr. President that you were the education president. I want to get the opportunity now to see some of those schools that you built. We went around – we went to one of his, a secondary school near the place where he was born – one of the remotest parts of Kenya. And I was talking to these kids, and it became immediately clear to me that a lot of these kids could one day actually go to places like MIT, CalTech. It was amazing to find that they were so familiar with my work. And I said “how?” They said: we listen to you on the radio. We never miss your program. Why? They said, well because of the things you do, you're like a teacher, it's like you're teaching us about Africa. And it's amazing, they would say, that you've stayed in the states for many years but you have never lost your accent, your intonation. We identify with you very easily. You never try to become what you are not, you know stuff like that. So, it's amazing what it has really done for me and it's incredible, it's incredible…
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Tuesday, December 28, 2010

Rwanda, Burundi cry foul on Mwapachu succession

East African Community secretary general, Juma Mwapachu. Photo/FILE East African Community secretary general, Juma Mwapachu. Photo/FILE 
By CATHERINE RIUNGU
Posted Monday, December 27 2010 at 00:00

The vacancy created by the impending exit of East African Community Secretary General Juma Mwapachu is dividing the region, between Rwanda and Burundi on the one hand and Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda on the other.
Related Stories
Sources familiar with Rwanda’s President Kagame’s thinking say that the new entrants into the EAC view as “unfortunate and divisive” the arguments advanced by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania that it is not yet time for a Rwandese or Burundian to lead the EAC — ostensibly because the new member countries are “too young.”
It has not helped that the jostling for the position is being viewed in Kigali and Bujumbura in the light of the warming political ties between Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni and Kenya’s Prime Minister Raila Odinga.
The latter joined the Ugandan leader on the campaign trail three weeks ago.
“So Kenya wants it — and I think, given what transpired between Museveni and Raila in Uganda, we can understand why they would want the next five years to be in safe hands. But it is idiotic, you cannot have a membership organisation where rights are granted on basis of seniority — even though when it comes to paying contributions, everyone pays the same,” our source said of President Kagame’s feeling about the developments around the secretary general’s position.
Rwanda is making no secret of the fact that it is interested in putting forward a candidate to vie for the post when it falls vacant in April after the incumbent, Mr Mwapachu, a Tanzanian, steps down on rotation.
If this issue is not sorted out amicably, analysts say it could kill “the Community in the popular imagination” if the public thinks that Rwanda and Burundi are being shoved aside.
According to the Treaty establishing the body, the secretary general has to come from a different member state after each 5-year tenure.
Rwanda’s EAC Affairs Minister Monique Mukaruliza was quoted by the Rwandan press as saying that the country was ready for the seat.
“Under the traditional rotation arrangement, it is supposed to be Rwanda or Burundi’s turn to take over,” she said in an article published in the New Times.
“We shall agree with Burundi who comes first because we joined the bloc at the same time, but if Burundi agrees, we shall occupy the chair,” she added.
She argued that the principle of the Treaty for the establishment of the EAC is clear about the occupancy of the post of secretary-general.
Ms Mukaruliza added that according to Article 67 of the treaty, the secretary-general shall be appointed by the Summit upon nomination by the relevant Head of State under the principle of rotation.
Rwanda currently has the youthful lawyer Alloys Mutabingwa as Deputy Secretary-General in charge of Planning and Infrastructure, and the most likely candidate for the post, should Rwanda succeed in its bid for the powerful position.
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Monday, December 20, 2010

The Ocampo Six are Kenyans, but Rwanda, Uganda need to worry

President Kibaki (left) and Prime Minister Raila Odinga. The two principals are in a fix over the names released by ICC prosecutor Louis Moreno Ocampo
President Kibaki (left) and Prime Minister Raila Odinga. The two principals are in a fix over the names released by ICC prosecutor Louis Moreno Ocampo 
By Joint Report in The East African

Last Wednesday, International Criminal Court chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo kicked up a political storm in Kenya when he announced his intention to charge six Kenyans with murder, rape, and other related crimes.
The intended charges arise from the violence that followed the disputed 2007 elections. Nearly 1,300 people died and more than 500,000 fled their homes in the violence.
The six are Henry Kosgey, Minister for Industrialisation; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Uhuru Kenyatta; William Ruto, suspended Education Minister; Secretary to the Cabinet Francis Muthaura, former police chief Mohammed Hussein Ali and Joshua arap Sang, a journalist with Kass FM, a community radio based in the Rift Valley town of Eldoret that broadcasts in the Kalenjin language.
In the peace deal that ended the violence and resulted in a power-sharing coalition government between President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga, it was agreed that its perpetrators would face justice in Kenya or at the ICC in The Hague.
However, Kenyan MPs shot down any attempt to set up a local tribunal. Now, the same legislators who rejected a local solution to the Kenyan situation want the government to withdraw from the Rome Statute that created the ICC.
Ocampo’s release of the names of what has quickly become known in Kenya as “The Ocampo Six,” couldn’t have come at a worse time for the Kenya political class.
It points to an ongoing but unspoken, fundamental shift in power in Kenya that could fracture the political elite and dynasties that have ruled the country over the past 47 years.
“What is so interesting to me in the heat and noise of the ICC’s announcement is the reaction of the political class; the Ocampo Six being named, though anticipated for weeks now, somehow seems to come as a surprise,” said Martin Kimani, a writer, in a post to a listserve that circulates among Kenyan intellectuals, “A surprise to power that has been so insular and free of challenge that its owners are unable to believe that control could ever leave their hands, or that any process against them could possibly succeed.”
In the past two weeks, US diplomatic cables leaked by the whistleblower site Wikileaks have revealed scathing criticism of the Kenyan leadership.
Kenya is referred to as a “swamp of corruption” and the Cabinet as easily being Africa’s most corrupt, and all them crooked. The cables portray a country with a political system partly fuelled by drug money.
The leaks also demonstrate an elaborate plan to break the political elite’s grip on power by fanning a democratic revolution by the youth.
America’s ambassador in Kenya, Michael Ranneberger, speaks of how the “culture of impunity” perpetuated by Kenya’s political and economic elite that links directly to President Kibaki and Raila, continues to frustrate genuine reforms, warning that this could lead the country back into a civil war situation in 2012.
“While the culture of impunity and the grip of the old guard political elite on the levers of state power and resources remain largely intact, hairline fractures are developing in their edifice which — if we continue to work them intensely — will develop into broader fractures and open up the potential for a peaceful process of implementation of fundamental reforms,” he wrote.
This stung both President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga to attack Ranneberger and what they termed American hypocrisy.
Ocampo’s list and the WikiLeaks revelations have together undermined the collective Kenyan political class and, more shocking, revealed that the Americans are working on encouraging a total different crop of youthful leaders to oust the old guard

President Kibaki (left) and Prime Minister Raila Odinga. The two principals are in a fix over the names released by ICC prosecutor Louis Moreno Ocampo 
By Joint Report  (email the author)

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Posted Monday, December 20 2010 at 15:11

The WikiLeaks cables, in particular, blew apart a common assumption in politics — that Prime Minister Raila was, somehow, the blue-eyed boy of the West, particularly the Americans, and their diplomatic machines were all primed to ensure that he becomes president in 2012.
However, the US cables surprised many when they put Raila and Kibaki in the same boat as patrons of corruption.
In addition, though Ocampo said the ICC was not going after Kibaki and Raila because it did not have a mandate to prosecute those who might have “political responsibility,” in the same breath he said that if indeed that was the standard, then the two men would be in the ICC noose.
Obsevers though, consider that the inclusion of Muthaura, Kibaki’s right hand man with whom he has a special bond, was slapping a charge on Kibaki by proxy. Likewise, for Raila, whose right hand man in the 2007 elections was Ruto (although they have now fallen out), and whose place seems to have been taken by Kosgey, was equally repudiated by having his close allies on the list.
Indeed, many MPs on the Kibaki side of the Kenyan divide have lately been arguing that Raila, who called for “mass action” following the election dispute, should be dragged to The Hague. On the other hand, the Raila camp is arguing that Kibaki, who they say stole the election and thereby caused the violence, should be taken off to The Hague.
Ocampo’s list, and the WikiLeaks cables, therefore, could limit the ability of the Kenyan political dynasty to maintain its grip on power by handing over to an anointed successor.
Unlike its East African Community partners, Kenya’s politics feels like a monarchy. Raila is the son of Kenya’s first vice president, and the father of the country’s opposition politics, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga.
Uhuru is the son of the country’s founding president, Jomo Kenyatta, whose vice president for a while was Odinga.
Kibaki, who won’t be eligible to stand in 2012 because of the two-term limit, has his son Jimmy Kibaki and daughter Judy Kibaki angling to join politics — one of them will possibly inherit his Othaya constituency.
Raila has been grooming his son Fidel to join politics, and currently he is his father’s fixer, and has been in the news doing deals with fringe political groups.
If the ICC and the intentions of the Americans revealed in the leaked cables damage this political elite, it could scuttle their attempt to build a political dynasty. Some analysts say that would be a good thing, because it would “finally free Kenya.”
But other presidential palaces and State Houses in East Africa should worry too. For there is a pattern in the ICC indictments. Farther north, Sudanese President Omar al Bashir has been indicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity in the western Darfur region.
In DR Congo, warlords Jean Pierre-Bemba, Thomas Lubanga, Germain Katanga, and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, are currently being tried at the ICC for war crimes.
Northern Uganda rebel Joseph Kony, who heads the brutal Lord’s Resistance Army, which is now a roving bandit force sowing terror from Southern Sudan to the Central African Republic, has also been indicted.
Kony was indicted with nearly all of his military command; his deputy commanders Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, and like their boss, remain at large. Another, Raska Lukwiya, died in August 2006.
There has been, and there continues to be pressure by international groups to have Ugandan officials and military officers tried in the ICC for war crimes in eastern DRC. Between 1997 and 2008, the armies from the two protagonists occupied, or made frequent military invasions into eastern DRC.
They are partly blamed for the direct and indirect death of, going by conservative estimates, 3.9 million Congolese.

Humanitarian organisations put the fugure at 5.4 million, but critics say this number has been inflated by aid agencies to attract funding.
As one observer put it: “If the ICC has gone for six Kenyans for the death of just over 1,200 people and the displacement of 500,000; and Bashir is indicted for the death of about 250,000, it becomes difficult to continue ignoring calls to bring Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni to book for the death of 5 million.”
The observer also noted that “Burundi, where tens of thousands of people were killed in much the same circumstances as in Kenya, should also be a country of interest to the ICC.”
In that sense, Kenya could be a “soft entrance.” One reason could be that it, and Tanzania, are the only civilian-led countries in the EAC.
Rwanda and Uganda are ruled by military men who came to power as the head of guerrilla armies, who have tried to convert themselves into civilian rulers through limited elections and transforming their military parties into regular political organisations.
According to this view, the ICC hand is slowly closing in on Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda like a horse shoe, having dispatched DRC and Sudan’s perpetrators of crimes against humanity.
Recent Wikileaks suggest that Museveni’s currency is diminishing in American eyes. They quoted US diplomats criticising him for tarnishing a good record by turning rogue, rigging elections, and condoning corruption.
Rwanda and Uganda have escaped censure for their role in the DRC in the UN Security Council in the past, because they were able to leverage their close strategic alliance with the USA and the UK to block it.
But with the USA getting jaded with Museveni, and its global clout beginning to wane, the ICC will face less big power obstruction in pursuing them for the DRC atrocities. Burundi, might, for that reason, be an easier pick than Rwanda and Uganda.

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Saturday, November 13, 2010

Obama’s Congo Moment: Genocide, the U.N. Report and Senate Bill 2125


Source: www.global research.ca

Obama’s Congo Moment: Genocide, the U.N. Report and Senate Bill 2125

13 November 2010 Comments (0) Print This Post Print This Post
The official Oct. 1 release of the U.N. Report on Human Rights Abuses in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1993-2003, documenting the Rwandan and Ugandan armies’ massacres of Rwandan Hutu refugees and Congolese Hutus in the Democratic Republic of Congo, should be a defining moment for President Barack Obama. How will the USA’s first African American president respond to the detailed and widely publicized U.N. documentation of genocide in the heart of Africa, committed by the USA’s longstanding military proxies, the armies of Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni?
Few Americans realize that the Rwandan and Ugandan armies are armed and trained by the U.S. or that the U.S. military uses both countries as staging grounds, but they may learn about it now.
Few realize either that the sole piece of legislation that President Obama shepherded into law on his own, as a Senator, was S.B. 2125, the Obama Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006, in which, in Section 101(3), he quoted USAID:
“Given its size, population, and resources, the Congo is an important player in Africa and of long-term interest to the United States.”
Indeed. In 1982, the Congressional Budget Office’s “Cobalt: Policy Options for a Strategic Mineral” noted that cobalt alloys are critical to the aerospace and weapons industries, that the U.S. has no cobalt worth mining, that 64 percent of the world’s cobalt reserves are in the Katanga Copper Belt running from southeastern Congo into northern Zambia and that control of the region is therefore critical to the U.S. ability to manufacture for war.
Foreign powers and corporations’ determination to control Congo’s cobalt and the rest of its dense mineral resources has made the Congo conflict the most lethal since World War II.
Section 101(5) and (6) of Obama’s 2006 Congo legislation reads:
“(5) The most recent war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which erupted in 1998, spawned some of the world’s worst human rights atrocities and drew in six neighboring countries.
“(6) Despite the conclusion of a peace agreement and subsequent withdrawal of foreign forces in 2003, both the real and perceived presence of armed groups hostile to the Governments of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi continue to serve as a major source of regional instability and an apparent pretext for continued interference in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by its neighbors [Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi].”
What Obama identified as the “real and perceived presence of armed groups hostile to the Governments of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi” was, most of all, the real and perceived presence of “Hutu militias.” They were indeed the “pretext” for the predominantly Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Army’s massacres of Hutu civilians, Rwandan Hutu refugees and Congolese Hutus, with the help of the Ugandan People’s Defence Force – massacres now documented in the U.N. report leaked to Le Monde on Aug. 26, then officially released Oct. 1.
Since Obama described the militias as “apparent pretext for continued interference” in 2006, we can assume that he understood them as such on his Inauguration Day, Jan. 20, 2009, when Rwandan troops again moved into Congo. On that day, world headlines, alongside those he himself was making, included “Rwandan Troops enter D.R. Congo to hunt Hutu militias” (Telegraph), “Rwandan troops enter Congo to hunt Hutu rebels” (BBC) and “Rwandan troops enter Kivu to hunt Hutu rebels” (Radio France International).
On the same day, the Christian Science Monitor, in “Rwandan Troops enter Democratic Republic of the Congo,” reproduced the pretext that Obama had identified in S.B. 2125:
“Rwandan troops entered the Democratic Republic of Congo on Tuesday to tackle a Rwandan Hutu militia whose leaders are accused of taking part in the 1994 Rwandan genocide before fleeing to Congo.”
Since Obama understood the pretext in 2006, he no doubt understood it that day and no doubt understands it today, as Rwandan and Ugandan troops are rumored, once again, to be moving into Congo, despite international outcry about the U.N. report.
Hutu militias and other “rebel militias” in Congo can no longer serve as the devil, the eternal excuse or, as Obama said, the “apparent pretext for intervention in the Democratic Republic by Congo’s neighbors.” Most of all, they can no longer serve as the devil, the excuse and pretext for interventions by Paul Kagame, the general turned president and so long heroized as Rwanda’s savior, because Kagame’s own army’s massacres of Rwandan and Congolese Hutu civilians has now been documented in the U.N. report.
The leak and now the official release have finally magnified President, then-Senator, Obama’s obscure, still little known revision of the East-Central African story in his 2006 legislation, S.B. 2125, which then became Public Law 109-456.
Obama’s ‘Rwanda moment’?
John Prendergast and David Eggers, the ENOUGH Project’s tireless advocates for U.S. intervention in Sudan, suggested, in a New York Times op-ed that Obama’s “Rwanda moment,” like Bill Clinton’s in 1994, is now in Sudan, where, they say, Obama has a chance to do what Bill Clinton reputedly failed to do in Rwanda, intervene to stop genocide.
But Obama’s Rwanda, and Congo, moment is in Rwanda and Congo now, as the world reviews the U.N. report and Rwandan troops once again advance into Congo.
He doesn’t need to intervene but to stop intervening, by withdrawing the military support, weapons, training, logistics and intelligence for Kagame, support that has so long equaled intervention. If he did so, peace and human rights activists all over the world would stand behind him and the narrative revision that he quietly penned three years ago.
An Obama decision to stop supporting Kagame would go up against the last 30 years of Pentagon intervention in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, but the U.N. Report turns his 2006 narrative revision into an outright reversal – with the weight of the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights and growing international opinion behind it.
And Obama is the commander-in-chief, with absolute executive authority over the U.S. armed forces. Yes, he can, should he choose to.
This article was previously published in Global Research.
Written by Ann Garrison
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Sunday, October 31, 2010

Who will get justice for the Bambuti? They have been exterminated in Congo by Ugandan-backed MLC and Rwandan-backed RCD rebels

by Kambale Musavuli on Sunday, October 31, 2010 at 3:21am
Reports of genocide click here to watch a video of pygmy people dancing
In 2003, Sinafasi Makelo, a representative of Mbuti pygmies, told the UN's Indigenous People's Forum that during the Congo Civil War, his people were hunted down and eaten as though they were game animals. In neighbouring North Kivu province there has been cannibalism by a group known as Les Effaceurs ("the erasers") who wanted to clear the land of people to open it up for mineral exploitation. Both sides of the war regarded them as "subhuman" and some say their flesh can confer magical powers. Makelo asked the UN Security Council to recognise cannibalism as a crime against humanity and an act of genocide. According to Minority Rights Group International there is extensive evidence of mass killings, cannibalism and rape of Pygmies and have urged the International Criminal Court to investigate a campaign of extermination against pygmies. Although they have been targeted by virtually all the armed groups, much of the violence against Pygmies is attributed to the rebel group, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo, which is part of the transitional government and still controls much of the north, and their allies (RCD-Goma - Rwandan backed rebel groups, and Ugandan soldiers).


Pygmies struggle to survive in war zone where abuse is routine
A threatened people are taken advantage of by everyone
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article402970.ece

DR Congo pygmies 'exterminated'
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3869489.stm

DR Congo pygmies appeal to UN
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Saturday, October 16, 2010

The Chronology of Hutu Massacre in Mbandaka on May13, 1997 by the RPF-AFDL Soldiers

SOURCE:HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

VII.  WHO IS IN CHARGE: TOWARDS ESTABLISHING RESPONSIBILITY

During a July 1997 interview with the Washington Post, Rwandan Vice-President Paul Kagame claimed that the Rwandan government had planned and led the military campaign that dispersed the refugee camps in Eastern Congo and ousted former President Mobutu.[86]  According to the Washington Post, Kagame was unequivocal concerning his objectives:
The impetus for the war, Kagame said, was the Hutu refugee camps.  Hutu militiamen used the camps as bases from which they launched raids into Rwanda, and Kagame said the Hutus had been buying weapons and preparing a full-scale invasion of Rwanda.
Kagame said the battle plan as formulated by him and his advisors was simple.  The first goal was to 'dismantle the camps.'  The second was to 'destroy the structure' of the Hutu army and militia units based in and around the camps either by bringing the Hutu combatants back to Rwanda and 'dealing with them here or scattering them.' [87]
Kagame's third objective was to topple Mobutu.  Congolese President Kabila confirmed Rwanda's military assistance in Congo during an official visit to Kigali on September 9, 1997, when he publicly thanked Rwanda for their help during the war.[88]
These statements lend support to the numerous testimonies taken by Human Rights Watch/FIDH from Congolese, refugees, and expatriates in Congo regarding the presence of Rwandan and other foreign troops in Congo during the war.  Similarly, Kagame's stated objective of destroying "the structure" of the ex-FAR provides a possible explanation for the active pursuit of refugees, former military, and militia across Congolese territory to areas of minor strategic importance, such as Mbandaka.
Despite the public recognition of military involvement, both Kabila and Kagame have denied that any civilian massacres took place by troops under their command.[89]  Both during the war and up to the present, however, the identities of many commanding officers and strategists of the ADFL and its allies were kept secret.  Throughout the seven-month military campaign, senior officers in the field were often out of uniform and many used only their first names in public.  Similarly, ranks were apparently confused or intentionally simplified to avoid identification of the military hierarchy: many officers of Katangese or Angolan origin were given or assumed the rank of "general", while numerous Ugandan and Rwandan officers were known only as "commander" or "colonel" followed by their first name only.  It is possible that many of these first names that were used in public are pseudonyms.
Regional power structures that reflect the pattern in Kinshasa have been put into place in many of the provinces.  In several regions, governors from the political opposition or from local ethnic groups have been installed, at times through simple hand-raising elections in stadiums.  Despite this apparent democratic method, Congolese community leaders and civil servants, international humanitarian workers, and U.N. officials claimed that civilian authorities have had little power in decision-making, especially regarding refugee issues, and that important questions were handled by military authorities.
In several provinces, Katangese generals have been installed as regional military commanders, seconded by Rwandan or Ugandan officers in charge of operations and questions related to refugees and security.  Tension often exists between the various military factions, especially between those of Rwandan or Ugandan origin and those from Angola, Katanga, or non-Kinyarwanda speaking groups.[90]  One Katangese general, allegedly responsible for the province of Equateur, stated flatly to a Congolese humanitarian official that he did not handle refugee issues.[91]
The identities of leading officers and strategists may have been intentionally hidden by the ADFL in order to protect those responsible for war crimes.  Nevertheless, some became known to embassies in Kinshasa, humanitarian organizations, and Congolese, as either strategists or field commanders, or both.  Lt. Colonel James Kabarebe, often known as Commander"James," or "James Kabare," was described by a U.S. Embassy official in Kinshasa as the most powerful commander in Congo and a principal strategist during the seven-month war.[92]  An English-speaker, James claims to have grandparents from Rutshuru in North-Kivu, and has spent time in Uganda. James was active in the field during the war, telling an embassy official in Kinshasa how he changed the tactics of the ADFL after taking Kisangani.  He was reportedly the field commander for the decisive battle at Kenge just prior to the fall of Kinshasa and was subsequently responsible for troops taking the capital.
James continued to play a key role in the military structure in Kinshasa and is likely the most powerful officer in Congo as of this writing.   He participated in the first official talks between President Kabila and U.S. Ambassador Bill Richardson in Lubumbashi in early June 1997.  Rwandan Vice-President Kagame acknowledged that James was a key commander operating in Congo during the war and had been assigned to organize the new Congolese army.[93]
Other officers were seen regularly by many observers in areas where massacres took place.  Below is a list of some of these individuals who may have been involved in, or been aware of, the organization or execution of civilian massacres in Congo.  The list is incomplete, and likely represents a small fraction of those involved.  Human Rights Watch/FIDH publishes the list not in an effort to accuse the below of war crimes but to insist that investigations are initiated by appropriate governments to clarify the role of each of these individuals and, equally important, other parties implicated in the massacres.

Commander "David"

Referred to as commander or major, originally from Rwanda or the Rutshuru area of North-Kivu.  A fluent English and Kinyarwanda speaker, David has said that he left Rwanda at a young age to study in Uganda.  By some reports, he also studied in Canada.  According to numerous testimonies, he is approximately thirty years old, six foot one inch tall, thin, and has longish hair, very dark skin, and features characteristic of many ethnic Tutsi. David is a member of the RPA.[94]
David played an important role in the fall of Goma on October 31, 1997.  Expatriates in Goma at the time were instructed by UNHCR to refer to "Major David" in the event that they encountered the RPA during their evacuation.[95]
David was in Beni in November 1996, in Isiro in early 1997, and finally in Kisangani in April 1997 during the period when access was cut to refugee camps and large-scale massacres were taking place.[96]  David was in Mbandaka on May 13, 1997, where eyewitnesses report over 1,300 people killed by ADFL troops and their allies.[97]  David told several sources in Mbandaka how he had made the journey from Kisangani to Mbandaka on foot.
After the departure of Commandant Wilson and Commandant Godfrey (see below) from Mbandaka, David claimed to be responsible for Equateur.  David was described by many who had dealings with him as being very intelligent, helpful, and a disciplinarian.  On at least one occasion, he ordered a soldier under his command to be flogged in public for an alleged rape.[98]  In an informal conversation with colleagues, he mentioned how easy it was to kill:
It's so easy to kill someone; you just go-[pointing his finger like a pistol]-and it's finished.[99]

General Gaston Muyango

A native of the Katanga region, General Muyango is reportedly a Tshiluba, Lingala, and Portuguese speaker. Muyango was at numerous locations between Kisangani and Mbandaka shortly after killings took place.  He arrived in Mbandaka on May 13, 1997 where over 1,300 refugees were killed by ADFL troops and their allies.  In Mbandaka, he lived in ex-Minister Eduard Mokolo's house on Avenue Itela.[100]
Despite his rank of general, Muyango was described by numerous Congolese and expatriates as having little power in Mbandaka.  Humanitarian workers claimed that for important decisions they were referred to Commanders David, Godfrey Kabanda, or Wilson.  Muyango stated in several private conversations that he didn't deal with refugee issues.  He was reportedly often in conflict with these commanders and left Mbandaka around the third week in June.

Commander "Godfrey" Kabanda

Commander "Godfrey" was reportedly either the top commander or a commander of operations for the ADFL in Mbandaka on May 13, 1997 during the Mbandaka massacre. He is described as short and robust and having facial features characteristic of some Tutsi.  Godfrey claimed to be the military commander for the Equateur region.  According to press reports, Godfrey denied that any massacre had taken place in Mbandaka but spoke openly of how many of his soldiers were Tutsi survivors of Hutu refugee attacks on Congolese Tutsi in eastern Congo in 1996.[101]
Godfrey left Mbandaka within a few weeks after the May 13, 1997 massacre.

Lt. Colonel or Col. Cyiago (Kiago)

Often seen just behind the front lines during the war, a Lt. Colonel or Colonel with a name close to Cyiago (or "Kiago") was responsible for some of the ADFL troops on the road between Kisangani and Mbandaka, an area where massacres took place. A Kinyarwanda and Kiswahili speaker, Cyiago is tall, dark, thin and reportedly used an interpreter for his communications.  Cyiago has been accused of being involved in the abduction of at least one Congolese civil servant who had spoken out concerning the killings in Equateur.  Cyiago is a member of the RPA.[102]

Commander or Lt. Colonel "Wilson"

Wilson was at or near sites in South-Kivu, Haut-Congo, and Equateur during periods when massacres took place.  Several reports indicate that he may be responsible for a special unit of RPA, composed primarily of experienced Rwandan soldiers, that has been implicated in several large massacres in Congo.[103]
Wilson was in Kisangani during military interventions that took place at Biaro, Kasese I, and Kasese II that likely resulted in thousands of refugee deaths. According to aid workers in Kisangani, Wilson was responsible for training and inciting the local Congolese population south of Kisangani to launch attacks against refugees.  He was a commander for RPA operations in Mbandaka on May 13, 1997, when a massacre took place.  He was in Mbandaka until approximately May 24, 1997 when he was reportedly replaced by Commander David.[104]
Wilson has striking facial scarification and, in addition to English, speaks the Kiswahili typical of Uganda. He claims to be from Uvira, in eastern Congo and is described as professional and intelligent by many who dealt with him on refugee issues.  Wilson reportedly often went by the alias "Khadafi" in Rwanda as an RPA officer.[105]

Colonel "Richard"

According to members of the ADFL military in Mbandaka, Colonel Richard, a member of the RPA, was one of the commanders responsible for operations at Mbandaka during the massacre May 13, 1997.[106]

Major "Jackson" Nkurunziza (or Nziza)

An officer reported to be Major Nkurunziza (also referred to as Colonel or Commander  "Jackson") was seen by numerous sources in Maniema, South-Kivu and Haut-Congo near sites where refugees  were concentrated and/or massacres took place.  Jackson, according to Congolese and aid workers also known as "the exterminator," speaks the Kiswahili of Uganda as well as fluent English and Kinyarwanda.[107]
In early April, Jackson was a commander in the Shabunda area where he told aid workers that his mission was to eliminate ex-FAR and Interahamwe.  During this period, humanitarian sources saw mass graves and decomposing bodies of what they state were civilian refugees in the Shabunda and neighboring areas. Corroborating sources state that Jackson was at barriers south of Kisangani during mid- to late April 1997 when massacres allegedly were taking place at refugee camps in the area.  He was in Kisangani until mid-May and later in South-Kivu and Maniema as late as July 1997 during a period in which UNHCR was organizing voluntary repatriation.[108]  He was seen again in Kisangani as recently as early September 1997.[109]

Commander "Joseph"

Commander "Joseph" or "Yusef", according to witnesses from the Masisi area,was in charge of ADFL troops based in the village of Rukwi in North-Kivu in late 1996. Joseph, reportedly a captain from the Burundian army, has been accused by eyewitnesses of commanding troops who participated in massacres in the villages of Nyakariba and Nyamitaba in late December 1996.[110]

Colonel "Dominic Yugo"

According to testimony from local Congolese NGOs, countless journalists, and international humanitarian workers, a commanding officer among Mobutu's mercenaries in the Kisangani area by the name of Colonel "Dominic Yugo" was responsible for numerous abuses and violations of international humanitarian law.  Yugo, a Serb, personally executed and tortured Congolese civilians suspected of collaborating with the ADFL. On March 8, 1997, on a road near the Kisangani airport, Yugo shot and killed two Protestant missionaries, with bibles in hand, accusing them of being ADFL spies.[111]  A beef importer from Goma was arrested by mercenaries on February 23, 1997 under Yugo's command and later described how he and others in detention were tortured and subject to inhumane treatment by Yugo himself.[112]
According to an aid official, Yugo claimed responsibility for air attacks on Walikale and Bukavu, incidents which resulted in numerous civilian deaths and casualties.[113]

[86]John Pomfret, "Rwanda Planned and Led the Attack on Zaire," Washington Post, July 9, 1997.
[87]Ibid.
[88]Integrated Regional Information Network, Update 245, September 10, 1997.
[89]In his interview with the Washington Post, Kagame does not deny the possibility of "individual atrocities".
[90]In addition to numerous reports describing this tension, three separate shooting incidents in three different provinces occurred between Rwandan and Katangan elements during the Human Rights Watch/FIDH stay in Congo.  At least four military deaths resulted.
[91]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, Mbandaka, August 20, 1997.
[92]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, U.S. Embassy, Kinshasa, August 22, 1997.
[93]John Pomfret, "Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo," Washington Post, July 9, 1997.
[94]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews in Kinshasa and Goma, August 1997.
[95]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview with aid workers in Goma, November 1996.
[96]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews with U.S. Embassy official, Kinshasa, August 22, 1997, and aid workers in Goma, August 28, 1997.
[97]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews with development workers of Mbandaka, Kinshasa, August 5, 1997.
[98]Human Rights Watch/FIDH telephone interviews with aid workers formerly in Mbandaka, July 1997.
[99]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview with colleague of David, Congo, August 27, 1997.
[100]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews with eyewitnesses between Kisangani and Mbandaka, August 1997.
[101] Colin Nickerson, "Refugee Massacre Unfolds in Congo," Boston Globe, June 6, 1997.
[102]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews, first village, Kinshasa, and Nairobi, July and August, 1997.
[103]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews with journalists and aid workers in the field, July and September 1997.
[104]Ibid.
[105]Human Rights Watch/FIDH telephone interviews with U.N. officials in Europe, July 1997.
[106]Human Rights Watch/FIDH telephone interview with journalist in Washington, September 30, 1997.
[107]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews, Congo, Nairobi, and New York, July-September 1997.
[108]Ibid
[109]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews with journalists, aid workers, and U.N. officials, July-September 1997.
[110]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews, Nairobi, March and August 1997.
[111]James McKinley, "Serb Who Went to Defend Zaire Spread Death and Horror Instead," New York Times, March 19, 1997.
[112]Ibid.
[113]Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, UNHCR official, September 1997.
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